Add v2.5 styled trace paper with binary-download guidance

IF_EMOTION_DEBUGGING_TRACE_WHITEPAPER_v2.5_STYLED.md

@@ -0,0 +1,291 @@
+# IF.EMOTION TRACE PROTOCOL v2.5: AUDITABLE DEBUGGING (WITHOUT WISHFUL THINKING)
+
+**Subject:** End-to-End Traceability, Completeness Witnessing, and PQ-Anchored Evidence Binding  
+**Protocol:** IF.TTT (Traceable, Transparent, Trustworthy)  
+**Version:** 2.5 (Transport Compatibility + Verification Guidance)  
+**Date:** 2025-12-21  
+**Status:** AUDIT REQUIRED  
+**Citation:** `if://whitepaper/emotion/trace-protocol/v2.5`  
+
+---
+
+## 0) Layered Stack (Where Guarantees Live)
+
+```mermaid
+flowchart TB
+  U[User Browser] -->|HTTPS| E[Edge: TLS + Routing]
+  E -->|/oauth2/*| O[oauth2-proxy]
+  E -->|/api/*| N[nginx]
+  N --> B[Backend Witness Boundary]
+
+  B --> R[Retrieval / RAG]
+  B --> P[Prompt Build]
+  B --> M[Model Inference]
+  B --> X[Postprocess: citations + trace footer]
+
+  B --> T1[REQ_SEEN ledger\n(hourly JSONL)]
+  B --> T2[Trace events\n(hash chain JSONL)]
+  B --> T3[Signed summary\n(output hash + head attestation)]
+
+  T1 --> H[Signed Merkle head\n(per hour)]
+  T2 --> S[Trace head\n(event_hash)]
+
+  H --> BUNDLE[Evidence bundle\n(tar.gz + manifest)]
+  S --> BUNDLE
+  T3 --> BUNDLE
+
+  BUNDLE --> REG[IF.TTT registry\n(PQ-hybrid anchor)]
+  BUNDLE --> MIRROR[Public static mirror\n/ static / hosted]
+```
+
+**Interpretation:** integrity starts at the backend witness boundary. Completeness (REQ_SEEN) is only meaningful at and after that boundary until edge witnessing is implemented.
+
+---
+
+## 1) What This Protocol Actually Guarantees
+
+This system does not try to “prove the model is true.” That is not a meaningful claim for probabilistic generation.
+
+This system proves something narrower and more valuable:
+
+1) what the system received (as a commitment),  
+2) what the system did (trace event chain),  
+3) what the system returned (output hash),  
+4) what evidence it claims to have used (retrieval IDs + citation handles),  
+5) that the resulting artifacts are tamper-evident and portable for external review.
+
+If a claim cannot be bound to an artifact, it does not exist.
+
+---
+
+## 2) The Trace ID Contract (Non-Negotiable)
+
+Every request to `/api/chat/completions` receives a Trace ID. This includes denials.
+
+**Surfaces:**
+
+- **Header:** `X-IF-Emotion-Trace: <uuid>`
+- **Header:** `X-IF-Emotion-Trace-Sig: <sig>` (app-level integrity)
+- **User output:** final line `Trace: <uuid>`
+
+The Trace ID is the support ticket, the incident handle, and the audit join key.
+
+---
+
+## 3) Completeness: REQ_SEEN Witness Ledger (And Its Real Boundary)
+
+Integrity alone is easy. Completeness is where systems lie.
+
+### What REQ_SEEN does (v2.x)
+
+REQ_SEEN records every request attempt that reaches the backend witness boundary as a privacy-preserving commitment:
+
+- `user_text_sha256`, `user_len`, decision/reason, and `leaf_hash`
+
+It writes:
+
+- Hour ledger: `/opt/if-emotion/data/req_seen/<YYYYMMDDTHH>.jsonl`
+- Signed Merkle head: `/opt/if-emotion/data/req_seen/heads/<YYYYMMDDTHH>.json`
+
+### The boundary (explicit)
+
+REQ_SEEN completeness is only valid for requests that reach the backend process. Requests blocked before the backend are out of scope until the witness is moved to the edge proxy.
+
+This is not a weakness in wording. It is a hard boundary condition.
+
+---
+
+## 4) Merkle Proofs: Roots Are Not Enough
+
+A signed Merkle root helps, but roots alone do not give efficient proofs.
+
+v2.x adds inclusion proofs for REQ_SEEN:
+
+- A specific trace can be proven to exist in an hourly ledger with an O(log n) Merkle path.
+- The proof is generated from the ledger and verified against the signed head.
+
+Verification tooling is provided via `iftrace.py` (see Section 10).
+
+---
+
+## 5) Trace Events: Hash Chain + Immediate Head Attestation
+
+Trace events are stored as a hash chain in:
+
+- `/opt/if-emotion/data/trace_events.jsonl`
+
+Each event includes:
+
+- `prev_hash` pointer
+- `event_hash` computed as `sha256(prev_hash || canonical_json(event_without_event_hash))`
+
+This detects deletion or modification of interior events. It does not prevent a malicious deployment from not emitting events. That is addressed as a limitation and a roadmap item (Section 11).
+
+The trace head is also attested in the signed completion record with an app-level Ed25519 signature so integrity can be verified immediately.
+
+---
+
+## 6) Canonicalization: What We Hash Must Be Stable
+
+Cryptographic systems die by “almost the same bytes.”
+
+v2.x mandates canonical JSON bytes for hashing/signing:
+
+- Primary: `canonicaljson.encode_canonical_json(obj)`
+- Fallback: stable JSON serialization (`sort_keys`, fixed separators, UTF-8)
+
+If two environments hash different bytes for “the same object,” you have no protocol.
+
+---
+
+## 7) Key Management (POC-Grade Today, Audit-Grade Tomorrow)
+
+### Current state
+
+- App Ed25519 signing key:
+  - Private: `/opt/if-emotion/data/trace_ed25519.key` (0600)
+  - Public: `/opt/if-emotion/data/trace_ed25519.pub` (shipped in bundles)
+  - Key ID: `ed25519-app-v1`
+
+The key is generated by libsodium-backed primitives and stored on disk with file permissions. This is acceptable for a POC, not for external certification.
+
+### Rotation and compromise (required discipline)
+
+- If the key is compromised: rotate immediately, bump `key_id`, and mark all traces from that time window as `trust_tier=degraded` unless independently anchored.
+- Old signatures remain verifiable with the historic public keys; key history must be preserved.
+
+### Certification path
+
+- Move keys to HSM/TPM or threshold signing.
+- Bind deploy attestations (image digest + config hash) to IF.TTT.
+
+---
+
+## 8) Post-Quantum: What Is PQ Today (And What Isn’t)
+
+### What is PQ-anchored today
+
+Evidence bundles are PQ-hybrid signed when registered into IF.TTT. The IF.TTT registry record includes:
+
+- `pq_status: hybrid-fips204`
+- `pq_algo: ML-DSA-87`
+
+This is the PQ anchoring layer.
+
+### What is not PQ today
+
+Hot-path app signatures (Ed25519) are not post-quantum. That is a conscious trade:
+
+- Ed25519 provides immediate integrity at low latency.
+- PQ signing occurs at registration time in IF.TTT.
+
+The correct claim is “PQ-anchored at registry time,” not “PQ everywhere.”
+
+---
+
+## 9) IF.story: Readability Without Evidence Drift
+
+IF.story is a deterministic narrative projection of `trace_events.jsonl`.
+
+It is not evidence. It is an index.
+
+Each IF.story line includes the `event_hash` anchor, and auditors should verify those anchors against the raw JSONL.
+
+---
+
+## 10) Verifier Tooling (Independent Checks, Not Operator Vibes)
+
+The bundle is designed to be verified with a single command and then deep-audited selectively.
+
+Verifier:
+
+- `iftrace.py verify <tar.gz> --expected-sha256 <sha>`
+
+Merkle inclusion proof (REQ_SEEN):
+
+- `iftrace.py prove-inclusion --ledger <req_seen_hour.jsonl> --head <req_seen_head.json> --trace-id <uuid>`
+- `iftrace.py verify-inclusion <proof.json>`
+
+Checksum rules (important):
+
+- `sha256s.txt` intentionally excludes itself and `manifest.json` to avoid self-referential checksum traps.
+
+---
+
+## 11) Threat Model and Limitations (Explicit)
+
+### A) Truncation and external anchoring
+
+Hash chains detect edits. They do not prevent truncation unless head hashes are anchored externally or independently cached.
+
+Current mitigation:
+
+- IF.TTT registration anchors the tarball hash into a separate chain.
+
+Remaining requirement for certification:
+
+- scheduled external anchoring of IF.TTT head hashes to a public append-only log.
+
+### B) Clock integrity
+
+Timestamps are derived from system clocks and are not trusted for cryptographic time.
+
+Ordering is guaranteed by hash chain indices and hash pointers, not by wall-clock truth.
+
+Certification path:
+
+- introduce time witnesses or external timestamping for head hashes.
+
+### C) Code integrity
+
+Hash chains detect post-hoc tampering. They do not prevent a modified binary from choosing not to record.
+
+Certification path:
+
+- signed deploy attestations (image digest + config hash) bound into IF.TTT
+- optional remote attestation
+
+---
+
+## 12) Reference Proof Run (v2.1) — Public Transport Verified
+
+Trace ID:
+
+- `016cca78-6f9d-4ffe-aec0-99792d383ca1`
+
+Preferred download URL (static mirror for external reviewers):
+
+- `https://infrafabric.io/static/hosted/emo_trace_payload_016cca78-6f9d-4ffe-aec0-99792d383ca1.tar.gz`
+
+Static mirror directory (for discovery if a link is mistyped):
+
+- `https://infrafabric.io/static/hosted/`
+
+Alternate download URL (Forgejo raw; may intermittently return `415 Unsupported Media Type` depending on client/proxy behavior):
+
+- `https://git.infrafabric.io/danny/hosted/raw/branch/main/emo_trace_payload_016cca78-6f9d-4ffe-aec0-99792d383ca1.tar.gz`
+
+Tarball SHA256:
+
+- `7101ff9c38fc759a66157f6a6ab9c0936af547d0ec77a51b5d05db07069966c8`
+
+Transport-level verification (what is now publicly provable):
+
+- HTTP status: `200`
+- `Content-Type`: `application/octet-stream` (chosen for maximum client compatibility)
+- SHA256 matches the claim above (download integrity)
+
+One-line verifier (shell):
+
+- `curl -fsSL https://infrafabric.io/static/hosted/emo_trace_payload_016cca78-6f9d-4ffe-aec0-99792d383ca1.tar.gz | sha256sum`
+
+Expected output:
+
+- `7101ff9c38fc759a66157f6a6ab9c0936af547d0ec77a51b5d05db07069966c8  -`
+
+If a review tool reports `415 Unsupported Media Type` when fetching the tarball, it is usually the tool refusing to fetch binary content. Validate from a shell (curl/wget) or a normal browser download, then run the verifier locally.
+
+IF.TTT citation handle for the tarball (PQ hybrid signed):
+
+- `if://citation/c24fe95e-226c-4efc-ba22-5ddcc37ff7d2/v1`
+

IF_EMOTION_DEBUGGING_TRACE_WHITEPAPER_v2.5_STYLED.md.sha256

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ce3a221b478496c93943e77341c8d061ca5a5d037e34fb6b43db216d1e70bdbe  /root/tmp/hosted_repo_update/IF_EMOTION_DEBUGGING_TRACE_WHITEPAPER_v2.5_STYLED.md