# IF.TTT Failure Mode Analysis v1 (Why traceability is not optional)

**Author:** Danny Stocker (`ds@infrafabric.io`)  
**Canonical (static mirror):** `https://infrafabric.io/static/hosted/IF_TTT_FAILURE_MODE_ANALYSIS_v1.md`  
**Repo source:** `https://git.infrafabric.io/danny/hosted/src/branch/main/IF_TTT_FAILURE_MODE_ANALYSIS_v1.md`  
**SHA256 (sidecar):**
- `https://infrafabric.io/static/hosted/IF_TTT_FAILURE_MODE_ANALYSIS_v1.md.sha256`
- `https://git.infrafabric.io/danny/hosted/raw/branch/main/IF_TTT_FAILURE_MODE_ANALYSIS_v1.md.sha256`

**Subject:** Failure mode analysis of removing cryptographic chain-of-custody from an AI governance stack  
**Protocol:** IF.SEC.threat.model.v1  
**Status:** FORENSIC ASSESSMENT (not evidence; not certification)  
**Date (UTC):** 2025-12-21  

---

This document answers one question:

What actually breaks when you replace IF.TTT (Traceable/Transparent/Trustworthy) with “standard logs”?

This is not hypothetical theatre. This failure pattern has already harmed people at scale.

---

## 1) The compromise (how it really happens)

An organization removes **cryptographic signatures + immutable audit chaining** and replaces it with mutable JSON/text logging (Splunk/Datadog/etc).

The rationales are not “2ms latency”. The rationales are organizational:

- “Compliance says monthly audit exports are sufficient.”
- “We don’t want key management in the hot path.”
- “We can’t afford per-request signing costs at current volume.”
- “The new CTO comes from a startup background; they optimize for speed, not forensics.”

The shift is simple:

- From **proven identity** (key-based, non-repudiable)
- To **asserted identity** (string-based, deniable)

---

## 2) Immediate effects (technical)

Removing cryptographic binding causes immediate epistemic collapse:

1) **Identity spoofing**  
Any actor can write `{"actor":"admin"}` into a log stream. Without signature verification, “admin” is a string, not a proof.

2) **Repudiation becomes cheap**  
An operator can deny actions. The system has no mathematical contradiction to present.

3) **Post-hoc editing becomes indistinguishable from “cleanup”**  
Even honest operators edit logs during incident response (redaction, dedupe, “fix formatting”). Without a hash chain, edits are invisible.

4) **Time becomes an argument, not evidence**  
Wall-clock timestamps are not cryptographic time. A system clock can drift or be altered. If the log is mutable, time is now a narrative.

---

## 3) Cascade failures (systemic)

IF.TTT is the load-bearing wall. When it fails, upstream components lose their ability to prove they acted correctly.

- **IF.GUARD failure**  
An actor bypasses governance and injects a fake “Approved” record later. Without non-repudiable signatures and an immutable chain, the council cannot prove they *did not* approve it.

- **IF.emotion corruption**  
Retrieval context can be poisoned (bad document inserted) and the retrieval log can be edited to look “clean”. The system produces harmful output; the investigation cannot recover the root cause.

- **Swarm communications collapse**  
Inter-agent trust degrades: a message “from Swarm B” is no longer provably from Swarm B. Man-in-the-middle and replay confusion become operationally plausible.

---

## 4) Real incident scenario (how you lose in court)

**The “hot patch” liability event**

1) An LLM system is integrated into a support workflow (medical, legal, crisis, finance).  
2) Under pressure, an engineer hot-patches a prompt/config (“make it more helpful”).  
3) The system produces harmful guidance.  
4) A user captures the harmful output (screenshot, screen recording, saved HTML, exported conversation).  
5) During investigation, the engineer “cleans up” the deployment log line (panic, shame, or misguided privacy redaction).  

Outcome:

- The organization produces logs claiming the system used safe configuration.  
- The plaintiff produces the harmful output.  
- The discrepancy becomes **indefensible** because the chain-of-custody is missing.  

In high-liability domains, “we have logs” is not a defense. It is a liability amplifier.

---

## 5) Historical precedents (pattern, not analogy)

These are different domains. The shared mechanism is always the same: **mutable records + privileged access + institutional denial**.

- **UK Post Office Horizon scandal** — forensic dispute about ledger truth and privileged system access.  
  - Background: `https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/British_Post_Office_scandal`

- **Boeing 737 MAX / MCAS** — catastrophic outcomes coupled to opaque system behavior and disputed control/alerting assumptions.  
  - Background: `https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_737_MAX_groundings`

- **Wells Fargo fake accounts scandal** — incentive pressure plus record-keeping failures and downstream denial dynamics.  
  - Background: `https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wells_Fargo_account_fraud_scandal`

- **Volkswagen emissions scandal** — engineered “compliance theatre” in software, with auditors unable to trust vendor assertions.  
  - Background: `https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Volkswagen_emissions_scandal`

IF.TTT is designed to prevent the *mechanism*, not to claim these incidents had identical root causes.

---

## 6) Defense validation (what IF.TTT prevents)

IF.TTT prevents the “mutable record” class of failure by enforcing:

1) **Non-repudiation**  
Actions are signed by keys. “Who did it” becomes a proof, not a debate.

2) **Tamper-evident history**  
Events are hash-chained; deletions/edits break verification.

3) **Bounded completeness (within boundary)**  
Requests that cross the witness boundary are witnessed in REQ_SEEN with inclusion proofs.

4) **Portable evidence**  
Incidents can be exported as bundles with manifests + verifier commands, enabling third-party review without trusting the operator.

This turns disputes into verification.

---

## 7) Residual risks (what IF.TTT does not magically solve)

Even with IF.TTT deployed, real risks remain:

1) **Key compromise**  
If a private key is stolen, an attacker can sign bad actions that verify as “valid”. Mitigation requires hardware-backed keys, rotation, and incident response.

2) **Rubber-stamp governance**  
The audit trail can be perfect while the decision is wrong (fatigue, negligence, incentives). Mitigation requires IF.GUARD diversity + escalation rules + post-incident review.

3) **Boundary gaps**  
Events dropped before the witness boundary (edge, network) may be outside scope unless edge witnessing is enforced.

---

## Conclusion

Removing IF.TTT turns the system from **high-assurance intelligence** into a **black-box liability generator**.

The cost of “not having receipts” is not measured in milliseconds. It is measured in ruined investigations, regulatory exposure, and human harm.

